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I will be calling representationalism and 
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Fichte defends a version of the so-called 
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A ttention to the conception of the subject is central to the mod-ern debate. In a recent paper, I discussed the Fichtean subject in the epistemic context of German idealism. I argued that 
Fichte’s revision of the Kantian conception of the subject is both a 
basic contribution to the cognitive problem as well as fatally fl awed, 
hence not a viable solution to the cognitive problem. More precisely, 
Fichte’s distinctive revision of the Kantian subject goes too far in 
making cognition overly, even wholly, dependent on the subjective 
dimension.1 In this paper, I will extend the analysis of the Fichtean 
subject with reference to the so-called Copernican turn. 
Fichte’s view of subjectivity arises in the context of the Ger-
man idealist effort to formulate a cognitive theory of a new type. 
In rejecting cognitive approaches committed to metaphysical real-
ism, Fichte participates in the effort to rethink cognition from an 
idealist perspective. For purposes of this paper, I will understand 
idealism from a Kantian perspective, in informal terms, as the anti-
metaphysical, epistemically-constructivist view that we know only 
what we in some way “construct.” 
The paper begins with remarks on the origin of the cogni-
tive problem in ancient Greece, before turning to the critical phi-
losophy. I next depict Fichte as defending Kantian Copernicanism, 
or constructivism, and rejecting Kantian representationalism. The 
paper then studies Fichte’s views of the cognitive problem, and 
his account of the three axioms (Grundsätze)2 in his Grundlage der 
1. See T. ROCKMORE, Fichte, Kant, the Cognitive Subject, and Epistemic Constructivism, 
“Revista de Estudios sobre Fichte” 12 (invierno 2016) [https://journals.
openedition.org/ref/675].
2. The term “Grundsatz” is sometimes imprecisely translated as “fundamental 
principle” (see i.a. Science of Knowledge, 93), but actually this German word is 
Wolff’s German translation for the Latin (and originally Greek) “axioma”. 
Further “Lehrsatz” (theorem) is often translated as “discourse” (see i.a. Science of 
Knowledge, 120). This translation makes it diffi cult for the English reader to see 
that the Foundations of the entire Science of Knowledge, as Acosta suggests, follows 
a geometrical model of demonstrations, since it is composed of three axioms 
(Grundsäzte) and eight theorems (Lehrsätze). Hence, it follows that Fichte is not a 
foundationalist. See E. ACOSTA, Transformation of the Kantian table of the categories 
in Fichte’s Foundations of the entire science of knowledge of 1794/95, “Anales del 
Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía” 33/1 (2016) 113, n. 47.
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gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. I will be arguing three points: fi rst, 
Kant’s position includes two incompatible approaches to knowl-
edge I will be calling representationalism and constructivism; sec-
ond, Fichte defends a version of the so-called Copernican Revo-
lution or Copernican turn, more specifi cally a revised conception 
of “representation” (Vorstellung), which no longer means “accurate 
representation”3 but rather, in Kantian language, “the appearance of 
something that appears”; and, third, though Fichte’s version of the 
Copernican Revolution improves on Kant’s, it is not a satisfactory 
solution to the cognitive problem.
PARMENIDES AND THE COGNITIVE PROBLEM
Theories are formulated to resolve problems and cognitive theo-
ries are formulated to resolve what I will be calling the cognitive 
problem. The cognitive problem arises in ancient Greek philosophy 
and ramifi es throughout the later discussion. Parmenides invented 
metaphysical realism, or the claim that to know is to know mind-
independent reality as it is beyond mere appearance.
In his poem On Nature Parmenides formulates a version of 
the epistemological problem that later echoes through the entire 
tradition in writing: to gar estin noein kai einai.4 His claim that know-
ing and being are the same anticipates the so-called identity the-
sis often identifi ed with German idealism, especially Hegel. The 
claim for the identity of knowing and being suggests there are only 
three main solutions to the cognitive problem: metaphysical real-
ism, epistemic skepticism and epistemic constructivism. Metaphysi-
cal realism is the view that to know requires a grasp of what is as it 
is, or, in another formulation, mind-independent reality. Epistemic 
skepticism is the view that, since we cannot grasp what is as it is, 
knowledge is not possible but impossible. Epistemic constructivism, 
which arose much later in the modern debate, gives up metaphysical 
3. See M. WILLIAMS, Pragmatism, Sellars and Truth, in J. O’SHEA (ed.), Sellars and his 
Legacy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) 223-260.
4. DK 28 B 3, Clem. Alex. strom. 440, 12; Plot. Enn. 5, 1, 8.
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realism as the cognitive standard in retaining the identity of know-
ing and being. Epistemic constructivism is the view that, though we 
cannot grasp metaphysical reality, we can grasp, hence know, what 
we construct. 
Metaphysical realism runs through the entire tradition starting 
in ancient Greece in providing a widely infl uential standard of cog-
nition. Plato’s commitment to metaphysical realism is central to his 
notorious theory of forms (or ideas). He rejects a causal approach to 
knowledge in denying the backward inference from effect to cause. 
In the Republic he suggests knowledge requires intellectual intuition. 
In other words, knowledge is only possible if some among us, in his 
view philosophers, can intuit reality. Metaphysical realism remains 
infl uential in the present debate. Thus in his internal realist phase, 
Putnam defends the view, anticipated in the apocryphal story of the 
blind men and the elephant, that different theories provide different 
perspectives on the same mind-independent world.5 
A NOTE ON TRANSLATION
Kant suggests that it is easy to interpret a position from the angle of 
vision of the whole.6 But there has never been more than minimal 
agreement about how to understand the critical philosophy. Kant is 
diffi cult to interpret for several reasons. He does not write precisely; 
he has diffi culty in making up his mind; when his view evolves he 
fails to discard materials that no longer accurately depict his posi-
tion, and so on. It has not been noticed or suffi ciently noticed that 
in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant presents two inconsistent ap-
proaches to cognition side by side: cognitive representationalism 
and cognitive constructivism. 
Translation is crucial here. The term Vorstellung can be trans-
lated as either “presentation” or “representation.” If it is rendered 
as “presentation,” then it refers to what is present to mind only. If 
5. See H. PUTNAM, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 1981).
6. See I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Paul Guyer, Allen Wood (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1998) B xliv, 123.
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it is rendered as “representation” then it refers to correct depiction 
of a mind-external object as it is. Kant employs “representation” to 
refer to a cognitive grasp of the world. Fichte uses the same term to 
refer to what is present to mind without reference to the external 
world. I come back to this point below.
KANT ON REPRESENTATIONALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM
A phenomenon is what arises within mind for whatever reason. Ac-
cording to Kant, there cannot be an appearance without something 
that appears.7 An appearance is the appearance of something includ-
ing representations. A representation is the correct or accurate ap-
pearance of something however defi ned. Since things in themselves 
do not appear, they can be thought, as Kant says, without contradic-
tion, but neither experienced nor known.8
Representationalism and constructivism relate differently to 
metaphysical realism. Representationalism invokes metaphysical 
realism as its cognitive criterion. Constructivism abandons meta-
physical realism in claiming to know only what we construct.
It has already been pointed out that Plato denies the backward 
inference from effect to cause in invoking intellectual intuition of 
the real. Modern philosophy rehabilitates the backward causal in-
ference in returning to a causal approach to cognition in Descartes 
and others. According to Descartes, clear and distinct ideas are ef-
fects on whose basis we can reliably infer to the mind-independent 
objects as their cause. 
Kant is mainly understood against the background of modern 
philosophers. In following Kant’s suggestion, the critical philoso-
phy is often seen as focused on a response to Hume. Kant, who is 
committed to Newtonian mechanics, thinks that Hume’s attack on 
causality undermines modern science. Since Hume’s skepticism 
is directed against empiricism, this approach suggests Kant aims 
to reestablish it. In that case there are other important infl uences 
7. See I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, B xxvi, 115.
8. Ibidem.
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as well. Kant’s claim to know Plato better than he knew himself9 
calls attention to his relation to Platonism, hence to metaphysical 
realism. 
What I am calling representationalism is Kant’s version of the 
infl uential modern causal approach to cognition. In a causal ap-
proach the mind-independent object is the cause of which the rep-
resentation is the effect for which mind-independent reality is the 
cause. Representationalism and a causal approach to cognition go 
hand in hand. Plato rejects representationalism as well as a causal 
approach to cognition in favor of intuitionism. The Platonic rejec-
tions of intuition, representation, and causality are overturned in 
the modern debate.
Kant is often described, incorrectly in my view, as a represen-
tationalist.10 In the fi rst Critique Kant mentions representation in a 
cognitive sense in many passages. Representationalism is popular 
throughout the modern debate, including during the period when 
Kant was active. If Kant is a representationalist, then he is commit-
ted to the view that the thing in itself (or noumenon) is the cause 
and the representation is the effect. 
It does not follow that, if Kant discusses representationalism, 
he is committed to it. Kant also discusses constructivism, which is 
9. See I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, B 370, 396.
10. See, e. g., B. LONGUENESSE, Kant and the Capacity To Judge: Sensibility and 
Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1998) 17. “Kant’s fi rst formulation of the problem 
which eventually becomes that of the transcendental deduction of the categories 
in the Critique is to be found in his Letter to Marcus Herz of February 21, 1772. 
The problem of the relation between a priori concepts and given objects is the 
occasion for a more general inquiry into the relation between a representation 
and its object, an inquiry taken up again, almost word for word, nine years later 
in the Transcendental Deduction. However, the two texts differ in a fundamental 
respect. While the Letter to Herz presents the relation between a representation 
and its object as a causal relation between two heterogeneous entities, the 
representation that is ‘within’ the mind and the object which is ‘outside’ it, the 
Critique internalizes the relation between the representation and the object 
within representation itself, so that the problem assumes a new meaning. This 
fundamental shift is what I now want to examine.” Note that Longuenesse, who 
closely follows Kant, is, like many Kantians, apparently mainly interested in 
understanding the critical philosophy as a categorial analysis of experience and 
not in its role as a solution to the general problem of knowledge.
FICHTE, KANT AND THE COPERNICAN TURN
27ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 52/1 (2019) 21-41
inconsistent with cognitive representationalism. According to Kant, 
there has never been any progress toward grasping a mind-inde-
pendent object. That means, in Kantian language, that we cannot 
show that we can cognize the metaphysical real. This inference is 
consistent with Kant’s view that the thing in itself, or noumenon, is 
the cause of which sensory intuition is the appearance, or effect. Yet 
no road leads from the effect to the cause, or from the appearance 
to what appears. Hence representationalism in Kant’s formulation 
fails.
If Kant had no other cognitive approach, then we would re-
member him today as an important modern representationalist, 
even as the thinker who brought representationalism to a high point 
and an end. And the epistemological quest would end in cognitive 
skepticism. Yet he has another, more important approach to cogni-
tion, or epistemic constructivism, that is often mentioned but only 
rarely studied in any detail. I point out in passing that the most de-
tailed study of Kantian constructivism comes to the conclusion that 
Kant was unaware of the Copernican theory.11
ON KANT’S COPERNICAN TURN
Epistemic constructivism and epistemic representationalism are 
epistemic alternatives. Epistemic constructivism, at which I have 
only been hinting so far, is a second best theory, more precisely a 
cognitive approach that appears plausible as an alternative if repre-
sentationalism fails. Now it cannot be demonstrated that represen-
tationalism is false. Virtually any representational claim about the 
way the world is could conceivably be correct. It is possible, though 
not probable, that, say, through a miracle, supposed representations 
of reality, say the claim that the earth is fl at, are not false but true. 
Yet, as Kant points out, after some two and a half millennia of effort 
no longer appears promising. 
Kant, who seems to harbor no doubts about what the future 
11. See H. BLUMENBERG, The Genesis of the Copernican World, transl. by R. Wallace 
(MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000) 607.
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will bring, who abandons the effort stretching from pre-Socratic 
philosophy to the late seventeenth century to represent reality, for-
mulates the so-called Copernican revolution to fi ll the void caused 
by the inability to demonstrate knowledge of mind-independent ob-
jects. The “Copernican revolution” is a term already in use by Re-
inhold and Schelling to refer to the critical philosophy when Kant 
was active. Surprisingly, Marx uses it as well.12
Kant formulates the so-called Copernican turn in a single 
passage in several very brief claims. According to Kant, mathemat-
ics and natural science reached the secure path of science through 
a revolution, not, say, a developmental process. He has in mind a 
similar revolution for metaphysics understood as “rational cogni-
tion.” This has not been possible up to now, Kant says, in virtue 
of the assumption that “all our cognition must conform to the 
objects.”13 I understand this statement as a clear reference to meta-
physical realism.
In other words, though it was assumed that the criterion of 
cognition is metaphysical realism, in practice this approach has al-
ways failed to yield cognition a priori through concepts. I add, in 
going beyond what Kant says, that it further fails to yield cognition 
at all since it has never been shown how to cognize a mind-inde-
pendent object, nor how to grasp the metaphysically real. 
If this is correct, then it seems plausible that Kant’s central aim 
in the Critique of Pure Reason is, since epistemic representationalism 
fails, to provide a replacement theory through his conception of 
epistemic constructivism, or the so-called Copernican revolution. 
To avoid cognitive skepticism, Kant suggests as an experiment “the 
objects must conform to our cognition.”14 He does not think this 
12. “Similarly, fi rst Machiavelli and Campanella, then later Hobbes, Spinoza, Hugo 
Grotius, through to Rousseau, Fichte and Hegel began to consider the state 
through human eyes and deduced its natural laws from reason and experience and 
not from theology, just like Copernicus, who disregarded the fact that Joshua had 
ordered the sun to stop on Gabaon and the moon above the valley of Ajalon.” K. 
MARX, The Leading Article of the Kölnische Zeitung, in D. MCLELLAN (ed.), Karl 
Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford University Press, New York, 1977) 19.
13. I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, B xvi xvi, 110.
14. Ibidem.
FICHTE, KANT AND THE COPERNICAN TURN
29ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 52/1 (2019) 21-41
will make cognition possible, but rather that this will, as he says, 
“agree better”15 with the possibility of a priori cognition.
Three points are important here. First, Kant seems to have in 
mind a geometrical model. In Euclidean geometry, the construc-
tion of a single object, for instance, an isosceles triangle, proves 
the existence of the entire class of objects. Kant, who thinks there 
is only a single geometry, believes the a priori construction of geo-
metrical objects justifi es a posteriori inference about the objects of 
experience and, on this approach, knowledge. Second, post-Kantian 
German idealists, who agree we cannot cognize reality, reject the a 
priori cognitive model in favor of a posteriori cognitive models. In 
other words, they accept the general Kantian view that we cannot 
grasp mind-independent reality, in Kant’s view the thing in itself, 
but we can only know what we construct. Third, the effort to for-
mulate an acceptable version of the constructivist approach begins 
in modern philosophy in Hobbes, Vico and independently in Kant. 
German idealism is usually thought to begin after Kant, according 
to Franks in Reinhold’s reaction to the critical philosophy.16 Yet if 
constructivism is idealist, then Kant is already an idealist, and the 
German idealist tradition can be described as an ongoing effort by 
Kant, Fichte, Hegel and others to formulate a constructivist ap-
proach to cognition.17 
ON FICHTE’S COPERNICAN TURN
I have so far pointed to the relations between epistemic represen-
tationalism, epistemic constructivism, and metaphysical realism. I 
have suggested that, if not earlier, in the Critique of Pure Reason 
Kant rejects representationalism in favor of constructivism. Kan-
tian constructivism, which features a theoretical subject, is a priori. 
Fichte’s subject, which features a practical subject, is a posteriori. 
15. Ibidem.
16. See P. FRANKS, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and 
Skepticism in German Idealism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2005).
17. See, for this argument, T. ROCKMORE, German Idealism as Constructivism 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2016).
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Fichte follows but also transforms Kantian a priori constructivism 
into a posteriori constructivism.
Kant’s position arises in his response to modern thinkers such 
as Hume, Leibniz, Locke and Wolff, and ancient thinkers such as 
Plato and by implication Parmenides. Fichte’s position arises in 
reaction to Kant as well as to such important contemporaries as 
Schelling, and slightly earlier Spinoza, and more minor fi gures in-
cluding Schulze, Reinhold, Maimon, and others. 
It would be useful to follow the interaction between the dif-
ferent thinkers active in the post-Kantian debate on which Fichte 
draws. Kant, who holds that his position is misunderstood by his 
contemporaries, took steps to correct that misunderstanding in 
writing the Prolegomena, which was intended as a simplifi ed ver-
sion of his view, in formulating the basis of a theory about how 
to interpret a philosophical text, in preparing the B edition of 
the Critique of Pure Reason, and so on. Suffi ce it to say here that 
Fichte’s position arises in his effort running throughout his writ-
ings to present Kant’s position that he, like Kant, thinks is mis-
understood.
Kant suggests that an original thinker often knows how to 
work with but is unable to formulate an original insight. Fichte pre-
sents himself as the only one to understand the critical philosophy, 
in any case as someone who understands it even better than Kant. 
His view differs from Kant’s in numerous ways. Though Kant was 
one of the fi rst philosophers to teach anthropology in Germany, 
he typically seeks to isolate his conception of the epistemic subject 
from fi nite human being. In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant 
deduces the subject as an epistemic function that is not and should 
be confl ated with a fi nite human being. Despite this and other dif-
ferences between their positions, Fichte typically suggests that he is 
a deep Kantian, entirely faithful, if not to the letter, at least to the 
spirit of the critical philosophy. 
Fichte’s rethinking of the theoretical subject as fi nite human 
being totally transforms the critical philosophy. The point I wish 
to bring it out is that in the transition from Kant to Fichte the ap-
proach to cognition leaves behind the effort to describe the general 
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conditions of cognition for the very different effort to describe how 
fi nite human beings are capable of cognition. 
Kant’s Copernican turn breaks with the causal approach to 
cognition in suggesting that the cognitive subject cognizes the cog-
nitive object it constructs. Fichte breaks with Kant’s causal approach 
to reality as the cause and the representation as its effect. Fichte 
rejects the very idea of the thing in itself as “produced solely by 
free thought” and without any “reality whatever,”18 hence he breaks 
with a representationalist approach to the cognitive problem. He 
indicates his agreement with Kantian constructivism, in writing that 
“the [cognitive] object shall be posited and determined by the cogni-
tive faculty, and not the cognitive faculty by the object.”19
FICHTE ON THE SUBJECT OF COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTION
In rejecting representationalism, Kant turns attention from the ob-
ject, or thing in itself, to the subject. In the Transcendental De-
duction he claims to provide the quid juris,20 that is to “deduce,” 
or perhaps more accurately to justify, or argue in favor of, the 
categories or so-called pure conditions of the understanding. The 
“Transcendental Deduction” culminates in the Kantian subject, or 
transcendental unity of apperception that constructs what it knows. 
The Kantian cognitive subject meets four conditions: to begin with, 
it constructs what it knows as a condition of knowledge. Second, it 
is the highest point of the deduction, Further, unlike the Lockean 
subject, it is not “physiological,” hence avoids what later comes to 
be called psychologism. Finally, the subject, or the I think, must, as 
Kant obscurely says, be able to accompany all my representations.”21 
In short, no subject, no representation.
18. J. G. FICHTE, Science of Knowledge, edited and trans. by Peter Heath, John Lachs 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 1982) 10.
19. J. G. FICHTE, Science of Knowledge cit., 4.
20. I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, B 116, 219.
21. I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, B 132-133, 246.
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Fichte builds on but also alters Kantian constructivism. He 
implausibly claims to rigorously follow Kant, and even more im-
plausibly that the critical philosophy follows from his own, hence 
logically prior, principles. Descartes, who was as important in math-
ematics as in philosophy, provides a quasi-mathematical deduction 
of the conditions of knowledge in his epistemic foundationalism. In 
the interval between Descartes and Kant the strictly mathematical 
conception of deduction is discarded. In the Transcendental De-
duction Kant claims to deduce or, if the deduction depends on the 
so-called “quid juris,” at least plausibly describe the general condi-
tions of knowledge. Fichte does not “deduce” but rather describes 
the cognitive process. His view of the subject, hence his conception 
of its cognitive role, largely arises in reacting to Schulze and Rein-
hold in his “Review of Aenesidemus.” In his review, Fichte endorses 
Schulze’s criticism while rejecting his skeptical conclusions. He re-
formulates Reinhold’s principle as the claim that the “presentation 
[Vorstellung] is related to the object as an effect to its cause and to 
the subject as the accident to the substance.”22 
Fichte’s precise view is diffi cult to grasp, and perhaps even 
confused. It will be helpful to distinguish among “presentation,” 
“appearance” and “representation.” Above it was noted that “Vor-
stellung” can be translated as both “presentation” and “representa-
tion.” A presentation is something that is given to mind. Accord-
ing to Kant, if there is an appearance, then something appears.23 
An appearance is the effect of something given to mind without 
the claim to correctly depict it, since the inference from effect to 
cause does not hold. A representation claims that something given 
to mind that, through the inference from effect to cause, correct 
depicts reality, or the independent object. 
Kant denies that we can infer from the contents of mind to 
reality he refers to as the noumenon or thing in itself. Fichte follows 
Kant on this important point. He employs representational termi-
22. J. G. FICHTE, Review of Aenesidemus, translated and edited by D. Breazeale, Fichte: 
Early Philosophical Writings (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988) 72.
23. See I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxvi-xvii, 115.
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nology while limiting his cognitive claim to mere appearance, or an 
appearance to a subject that does not permit an inference to reality. 
Like Kant he does not claim to know the real in limiting cognition 
to appearance, or again anything more than the object for us. 
Fichte describes his theory in quasi-phenomenological fashion. 
According to Fichte, experience, which does not provide conscious-
ness of the world, provides no more than the contents of conscious-
ness, or presentations (Vorstellungen). The contents divide into two 
general classes: those accompanied by a feeling of freedom, for in-
stance, one may speculate, imagining or free phantasy; and those 
accompanied by a feeling of necessity for which philosophy needs 
to provide an account. “The system of presentations [Vorstellungen] 
accompanied by a feeling of necessity is also called experience.... 
Philosophy, in other words, must therefore furnish the grounds of 
all experience.”24 He has in mind the explanation of the contents of 
consciousness dependent not on ourselves but on the external world 
that limits our sphere of action. 
How is experience to be explained? The “Aenesidemus-Re-
view,” in which Fichte provides the initial statement of what later 
becomes his original position, suggests that Fichte takes the interac-
tion between subject and object as his basic experiential model. He 
distinguishes four kinds of subject, or self. The term “self” refers to 
fi nite human being as practically limited through interaction with 
the surrounding world. This suggests that Fichte understands the 
fi nite human being as in practice situated within and as interact-
ing with the surrounding world. Absolute subject or absolute self 
refers to an individual considered in theoretical abstraction from 
the interaction between a human and the surroundings. Since the 
absolute self is not accompanied by a feeling of necessity, it cannot 
be an object of experience. This concept is invoked as a theoretical 
construct only in order to explain experience. 
24. J. G. FICHTE, Science of Knowledge cit., 6.
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FICHTE ON THE ACTIVE SUBJECT
The enormous attention to the role of the subject is a key feature 
in the modern tradition. Montaigne and, following him, Descartes 
both present views of the subject as passive. Fichte argues for a very 
different, highly original view of the subject as always and basically 
active in two ways: on the one hand, he is constrained to do so by the 
logic of his argument. On the other hand, he holds each of us can 
immediately verify our own activity through “intellectual intuition.”
Fichte further develops a theory of the interaction between 
subject and object, self and world. According to Fichte, subject and 
object stand in a relation of inter-determination. Each element of 
the relation determines and is determined by the other. Since the 
self is active by defi nition, only three basic forms of activity are pos-
sible. Either the subject acts to limit the object, or it is limited by 
the object, or again it acts independently of the object. These three 
kinds of activity are called respectively positing, striving, and inde-
pendent activity. To posit (setzen) literally means to set, to place, or 
to put (something). Positing is a positioning of something in regard 
to something else, and the term suggests opposition. 
Positing is the form of activity through which Fichte accounts 
for consciousness. Fichte employs this concept to refer to a suppos-
edly necessary condition that is inferred but not given in experience. 
“It is intended to express that Act [Thathandlung] which does not 
and cannot appear among the empirical states of our consciousness, 
but rather lies at the basis of all consciousness and alone makes it 
possible.”25 According to Fichte, although positing cannot be expe-
rienced, it must nevertheless be thought. To strive (streben) means to 
struggle or aspire to, for, or after. Striving implies a perceived lack 
as well as an attempt to rectify it. Independent activity (unabhängige 
Thätigkeit) is in no sense determined by the subject-object relation, 
although it takes place within the bounds of this context.
A presupposition is an idea or concept that is accepted with-
out adequate justifi cation or perhaps justifi cation of any kind at the 
25. J. G. FICHTE, Science of Knowledge cit., 93. 
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beginning of a line of argument or action. Modern thinkers like 
Descartes and Husserl claim to avoid presuppositions of any kind 
in their theories. Cartesian foundationalism notoriously begins in 
describing the cogito as a principle that must be accepted since it 
cannot be denied. Fichte employs the term “presupposition” in a 
nonstandard sense in attempting to justify the presupposition of his 
position. 
The claim that the self is absolutely and merely active is Fichte’s 
“absolute presupposition.”26 He argues in favor of this claim, which 
is hence not a presupposition, claiming, as noted above, that the 
self is conscious of, hence able to verify, its activity. Selfhood and 
activity are synonymous terms. We remember that in reacting to 
Kant Fichte provides an anthropological rethinking of the subject 
as the basis of his theory. It follows that a self or individual is active, 
to be active is to be a human being, and we are not only active but 
also aware of our activity. Yet though a human being is aware of its 
activity or being active, it does not follow, and Fichte does not at-
tempt to show, that human beings are aware of the specifi c kinds of 
activity through which they can be said to construct the contents of 
experience accompanied by a feeling of necessity.
The Kantian categories refer to forms of activity of the mind. 
Fichte replaces the Kantian categories through which the object is 
constructed by his own set of types of activity, or laws of the mind. 
Positing occurs according to the three axioms depicted in the Science 
of Knowledge. The three axioms, which describe the relation of sub-
ject and object are identity, opposition, and grounding or so-called 
quantitative limitation. The three axioms are quasi-logical laws in 
terms of which experience must occur, and that can be known as 
well as explained. Taken together these axioms describe the unity 
and diversity, or identity and difference, of any cognitive object. 
Grounding should not be confused with the fi rst axiom, or 
the hypothesis that the self is active or activity, or again with an 
epistemological ground in a Cartesian sense. Positing, and hence 
all experience, belongs to a single paradigm of dialectically rational 
26. J. G. FICHTE, Science of Knowledge cit., 221.
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development. It follows that conscious experience must conform 
to laws of the mind, and there is no limit to our knowledge of the 
content of consciousness accompanied by necessity.
A NOTE ON FICHTE’S THREE AXIOMS
Fichte is, like Kant, a systematic thinker. He says that his system 
is the Kantian system presented in a different way. It needs to be 
judged not through its relation to the critical philosophy, but rather 
through its own merits. We see this especially in his account of the 
three axioms that begins the exposition of his position. 
Kant and following him Fichte propose transcendental theo-
ries. Transcendental Deduction follows Leibniz’ view that percep-
tion requires the unity of a multiplicity.27 Kant, who transforms 
this Leibnizian insight view into the highest principle of human 
knowledge,28 He famously describes it as “The I think [that] must 
be able to accompany all my (re)presentations.”29 Kant’s point seems 
to be that there cannot be a cognitive object without the subject that 
accompanies it, by which it is constructed and on which it depends. 
In other words, presentation (or representation) depends on the 
subject in which and to which it occurs as experience. Left unclear 
is the precise role the subject plays in either merely passively receiv-
ing or, on the contrary, as the Copernican turn suggests and Fichte 
makes explicit, in constituting the representation. 
Fichte accords special attention to the three axioms. They in-
clude in order the fi rst, absolutely unconditioned axiom that, in his 
words, is conditioned neither with respect to form nor content; then 
the second axiom, conditioned as to content; and fi nally the third 
axiom, conditioned as to form. These principles constitute Fichte’s 
reformulation of the Kantian view that the consciousness forms a 
unity in respect to which experience occurs. Experience must meet 
three conditions or limits, including: an underlying unity or iden-
27. See §14, in Monadology, in G. W. LEIBNIZ, Basic Writings, with an introduction by 
Paul Janet, translated by George R. Montgomery (Open Court, La Salle, 1957).
28. See I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, B 135, 348.
29. I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, B 13-132, 246.
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tity, as well as difference and, fi nally, the unity or identity of identity 
and difference. 
Fichte’s account describes as well as speculatively recon-
structs what from his perspective must occur for experience to 
be possible. According to Fichte, the fi rst axiom and the second 
axiom both derive from a fact of empirical consciousness. The fi rst 
axiom, which is “absolutely primary,” hence depends on nothing 
prior to it, can neither be proven nor defi ned, but is the basis of 
all consciousness. This principle is an identity or unity that, as the 
basis of consciousness, underlies and makes possible all diversity 
in its role as the initial principle of conscious experience. We can 
infer that without a single unifying absolute subject, experience is 
not possible.
According to Fichte, the second axiom conditioned as to form, 
is disunity, diversity or again difference that is given in conscious-
ness against the background of an underlying unity or identity. 
Since the subject is by defi nition a unity, Fichte describes diversity 
as the so-called not-self, or what the subject is not. In a dizzying 
set of remarks, he goes on to suggest that a necessary condition of 
experience is for the subject to contain what is not, in other words 
a divisible not-self, or again difference opposed to the self, in short 
the identity of identity and difference. 
FICHTE, KANT AND THE COGNITIVE SUBJECT
Elsewhere I have argued that Fichte goes too far in seeking, per-
haps under the infl uence of Reinhold, to derive everything from 
the subject. I do not want to repeat that argument here. The point 
Fichte brings out is that subject and object limit each other within 
the subject. I take Fichte to be suggesting that the fi nal explanatory 
concept from which the entire theory is derived is what he calls the 
absolute self. 
I have argued that Kant presents representational and construc-
tivist approaches to cognition. I have further argued that Fichte, like 
the mature Kant, adopts constructivism in place of representation as 
Kant understands it. According to Fichte, theory serves to explain 
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practice. From Fichte’s perspective, the version of the critical phi-
losophy that depends on reality is unrelated to practice. 
Fichte’s effort to present the Kantian position in independ-
ence of Kant is both laudatory, since he thinks Kant makes a basic 
breakthrough through the constructivist shift as well as critical. 
Kant thinks there has been no progress on the assumption that the 
subject depends on the object. He recommends as an experiment 
that the relation of subject and object be inverted so that the object 
is not independent of but rather dependent on the subject. 
Fichte approves the idea that the object depends on the sub-
ject, but thinks that Kant only goes half way so to speak. Fichte 
is especially critical of the Kantian position that is based on the 
indispensable but also unknowable thing in itself. According to 
Fichte, a theory based on anything other than or beyond the self is 
transcendent, hence dogmatic and necessarily leads to skepticism, 
since it is based on what we must know but cannot know. Fichte 
favors a theory that, on the contrary, is wholly and solely based on 
the subject, hence immanent, or critical. In the fi nal analysis, an 
approach to cognition through the subject shows that in practice 
we know objects only in so far as they pose limits to our activity. 
We do not know objects in themselves, but we can and do know 
them insofar as they are objects for us, or constructed through the 
interaction between subject and object. In this way Fichte develops 
the transition from a theoretical account of the general possibil-
ity of cognition to a descriptive account of cognition as it occurs. 
This belongs to the post-Kantian anthropological turn in classical 
German philosophy.
CONCLUSION: FICHTE, KANT AND THE COPERNICAN TURN
This paper has argued two points. On the one hand, Kant’s posi-
tion includes incompatible approaches to knowledge I have called 
representationalism that he explores and rejects, and constructivism 
to which he barely refers but adopts. On the other hand, Fichte, like 
the later Kant defends a version of what is sometimes designated 
as the Copernican turn or the constructivist alternative to Kantian 
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representationalism while rejecting any form of the venerable claim 
to base cognition on metaphysical realism.
The difference between Kantian and Fichtean constructivism is 
signifi cant. Kant is concerned with demonstrating the general con-
ditions of cognition. He does this in part by drawing attention to the 
distinction between fi nite human being and the abstract subject re-
duced to what is sometimes called an epistemic placeholder. Kant’s 
theory depends on a non- or even anti-anthropological conception 
of the subject variously described as the transcendental unity of ap-
perception, the original synthetic unity of apperception, and so on. 
Kant insists, and Husserl later insists, on the difference between an 
abstract conception of the cognitive subject to avoid confl ating the 
logic and the psychology of cognition. Kant’s Copernican turn is 
intended as a solution to the cognitive problem that, however, fails 
in that as Fichte, Hegel, Peirce and others later point out, human 
knowledge is limited by the limits of the human subject. 
The Kantian diffi culty lies in part in invoking a philosophical 
subject as the condition of cognition. Fichte corrects this diffi culty 
in replacing the Kantian philosophy subject by fi nite human being. 
Though Fichte’s reformulation of the Copernican Revolution im-
proves on Kant’s, it is also not a satisfactory solution to the cognitive 
problem. 
Fichte like Kant develops a causal view of experience and 
knowledge. In an important early remark on his relation, under 
Reinhold’s infl uence, to Schulze, Fichte remarks “…rather than 
employing Aenesidemus’ terms, the reviewer [Fichte] would prefer 
to say that the presentation is related to the object as the effect is 
related to its cause and to the subject as the accident is related to 
the substance.”30 
This early statement already commits Fichte to the Coperni-
can turn. The clue here is the change in the meaning of “(re)pres-
entation.” Kant understands this term in traditional fashion as the 
accurate, hence correct depiction of the cognitive object. Fichte un-
30. J. G. FICHTE, Review of Aenesidemus, in D. BREAZEALE (ed.), Fichte: Early Philo-
sophical Writings (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988) 72.
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derstands the same term as referring not to the mind-independent 
object but rather to the object for us in experience. 
Fichte’s basic insight improves on Kant’s Copernican turn, but 
is covered up by his baroque language. Fichte holds the subject does 
not create the object ex nihilo. It rather constructs the object expe-
rienced by us through an interaction between subject and object, or 
subject and its surroundings. 
Kant invokes a philosophical subject that Fichte replaces 
through a fi nite human subject. The Fichtean subject is limited as 
well as unlimited, limited by its relation to the mind-external ob-
ject and unlimited in its capacity of free action. This cardinal point, 
which appears to me to be both simplistic and incorrect, is also cor-
rectly contradicted by Fichte. In conceding one cannot decide be-
tween idealism and dogmatism on rational grounds, he famously 
suggests that “What sort of philosophy one chooses depends, there-
fore, on what sort of man one is.”31 
In sum, Fichte cannot have it both ways. Either the subject is 
free in the philosophical sense and one can in this way explain the 
possibility of experience or, on the contrary, it is always constrained 
within context. Rather than rely on the philosophical fi ction of an 
absolute self, a better, more satisfactory explanation would rely on 
a view of the subject as always within and hence in that sense con-
strained by its surroundings.
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